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Abstract. Recent years have shown that more than ever governments and intelligence
agencies try to control and bypass the cryptographic means used for the protection of data.
Backdooring encryption algorithms is considered as the best way to enforce cryptographic
control. Implementation backdoors (at the protocol/implementation/management level)
are generally considered. In this paper we propose to address the most critical issue of
backdoors: mathematical backdoors or by-design backdoors, which are put directly at the
mathematical design of the encryption algorithm. Considering a particular family (among
all the possible ones) of backdoors, we present BSEA-1, a stream cipher algorithm which
contains a design backdoor enabling an effective cryptanalysis. The BSEA-1 algorithm uses
a 120-bit key. The exploitation of the backdoor enables to break the cipher with around 2
Kbits of knowplaintext in a few seconds.
1 Introduction
Despite the fact that in the late 90s/early 2000s, citizens have partially obtained the freedom for
using cryptography, the recent years have shown that more than ever, governments and intelli-
gence agencies still try to control and bypass the cryptographic means used for the protection
of data and of private life. Snowden’s leaks were a first upheaval. A tremendous number of se-
cret projects (from NSA, GCHQ) have been revealed to the public opinion which proves this
situation.
While the need for the security of everyday life activities (for companies, for citizens) requires
more and more cryptography and highly secure communications means, recent bothering initia-
tives or decision by political decision-makers ask for an even stronger control over cryptography
not to say preparing the simple prohibition or ban of cryptographic application such as telegram.
The most recent decision towards the control over cryptography is that of the Australian govern-
ment [11] which makes mandatory the use of backdoor in encryption systems. At the same time,
the EU as well as a number of security agencies (such as French ANSSI, German BSI) confirmed
that it is nonsense and militate for the mandatory use of end-to-end encryption.
In this paper we address the most critical issue of backdoors: mathematical or by-design
backdoors. In other words, the backdoor is put directly at the mathematical design of the en-
cryption algorithm. The RSA’s Dual_EC_DRBG standard case falls within this category [3]. Other
non-public examples are known within the military cryptanalysis community, and partially re-
vealed to the public thanks to the 1995 Hans Bühler case [17]. There is quite no public work
on that topic. It is the technical realm of a few among the most eminent intelligence agencies
(namely NSA, GCHQ) which moreover have the ability and power to step in and to influence the
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international standardization processes in one direction or another. Recently Bannier & Filiol [1]
have published a block cipher algorithm (BEA-1) which is similar to the AES and which contains
a mathematical backdoor enabling an effective cryptanalysis. This block cipher algorithm (80-bit
block, 120-bit key size, 11 rounds) was designed to resist to linear and differential cryptanalyses.
This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we discuss the comparative feasibility of
backdoors in stream ciphers and block ciphers. We also present the state-of-the-art, history and
previous work regarding backdoors. In Section 3, we describe our backdoored stream cipher
algorithm BSEA-1 (standing for Backdoored Stream Encryption Algorithm 1 ) and address the
cryptographic security of this cipher, with respect to known cryptanalyses. In Section 4 we explain
how to exploit the backdoor when considering known plaintext and ciphertext only cryptanalyses.
Finally in Section 5 we summarizes our work and present future work.
2 The Concept of Backdoor in Symmetric Cryptology
The general concept of backdoor has been addressed in [1]. In this section, we just deal with this
concept when considering stream ciphers in comparison with block ciphers.
2.1 Stream Ciphers vs Block Ciphers
Their respective complexity is totally different, especially with respect to their combinatorial
complexity. We can define the combinatorial complexity as the number of internal configurations
that can be realized during the different steps of operation (key setup, encryption, decryption).
– Stream ciphers. Their design complexity is rather low since they mostly rely on algebraic
primitives (LFSRs and Boolean functions which have intensely been studied in the open
literature). The cryptographic properties of these primitives are well-known may it be for
the LFSRs or the Boolean functions used since the latter have generally a limited dimension
(the number of input bits, 4 or 5 at most). Until the late 70s, backdoors relied on the fact
that quite all algorithms were proprietary and hence secret. It was then easy to hide non
primitive polynomials, weak combining Boolean functions or more exotic designs. The Hans
Bühler case in 1995 [17] shed light on that particular case. Being secret, anyone who use the
algorithm may only perform a deep statistical analysis. In this respect, the pseudo-running
key (which is combined to the plaintext or the ciphertext) must always exhibit excellent
randomness properties.
– Block ciphers. This class of encryption algorithms is rather recent (end of the 70s for the
public part). They exhibit so a huge combinatorial complexity that it is reasonable to think
to backdoors. As described in [5] for a k-bit secret key and a m-bit input/output block
cipher there are ((2m)!)2k possible such block ciphers. For such an algorithm, the number
of possible internal states (which involves both the key and the input block whereas stream
ciphers just input a secret key) is so huge that we are condemned to have only a local view
of the system, that is, the round function or the basic cryptographic primitives. We cannot
be sure that there is no degeneration effect at a higher level. This point has been addressed
in [5] when considering linear cryptanalysis. Therefore, it seems reasonable to think that this
combinatorial richness of block cipher may be used to hide backdoors.
2.2 Previous Work
While a few research work does exist regarding backdoors in block ciphers (see [1, Section 2]),
there is not public research work on stream ciphers, to the author’s knowledge. It is somehow
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surprising when considering that from the mid-80s to the early 2000s, this class of encryption
systems has been widely studied. At the industry level (that of encryption machines sold to
governments), stream ciphers were also the vast majority of systems used throughout the world.
Since, there are still used, at least partly, in payTV systems, telecommunications and satellite
communication (where fast encryption is more than ever required), access control systems, sub-
way tickets, and various other security-related applications [14, 13, 12]... With the rise of IoT,
stream ciphers seem also to know some sort of come back.
As far as the intelligence world is concerned, NSA and GCHQ — among possibly a few others
— have conducted an intense research activity with regards to backdoors for this class of ciphers.
The Bühler case in 1995 [17] revealed that Crypto AG, a Swiss company and the main provider
of cipher machines for nearly 120 governments and international entities, was working closely
with the NSA to introduce backdoors in the encryption systems sold. So did a handful of other
European companies selling crypto-machines.
Another kind of backdoors in stream ciphers relates to implementations that enables the
secret key to be reused or to be the same with a high probability. For instance, the message
key (used along with a base key) may have a very short entropy. In this case the cryptanalysis
becomes rather easy [7].
3 Description of BSEA-1
The BSEA-1 algorithm (standing for Backdoored Stream Encryption Algorithm version 1 ) is
based on our research work and the analysis of the rare available technical details and exchanges
with experts in the field.
This section is intended to describe this cipher precisely. It is a classical combination generator
[15, Section 5.2] which uses a 120-bit secret key (Figure 1). The essential difference with this
design lies in the fact that the truth table of the combining Boolean function is modified at each
time instant t by one of the registers which is moreover irregularly clocked.
Fig. 1. General structure of BSEA-1 Algorithm
The cryptographic primitives are the following:
– Four Linear Feedback Shift Registers R0, R1, R2 and R3 of respective length L0 = 23, L1 =
29, L2 = 31 and l3 = 37. Their initialization is the secret key at time instant t = 0.
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– The four feedback polynomials are primitive and given by
P0(x) =x23 ⊕ x22 ⊕ x20 ⊕ x18 ⊕ x17 ⊕ x13 ⊕ x11 ⊕ x10 ⊕ x9 ⊕ x8 ⊕ x4 ⊕ x3 +⊕x2 ⊕ x⊕ 1
P1(x) =x29 ⊕ x28 ⊕ x27 ⊕ x25 ⊕ x24 ⊕ x23 ⊕ x22 ⊕ x21 ⊕ x18 ⊕ x17 ⊕ x13 ⊕ x11 ⊕ x10 ⊕ x6
⊕ x5 ⊕ x3 ⊕ x2 ⊕ x⊕ 1
P2(x) =x31 ⊕ x30 ⊕ x27 ⊕ x25 ⊕ x24 ⊕ x23 ⊕ x22 ⊕ x21 ⊕ x20 ⊕ x16 ⊕ x15 ⊕ x13 ⊕ x12 ⊕ x11
⊕ x10 ⊕ x9 ⊕ x8 ⊕ x4 ⊕ x3 ⊕ x⊕ 1
P3(x) =x37 ⊕ x34 ⊕ x33 ⊕ x32 ⊕ x30 ⊕ x29 ⊕ x26 ⊕ x24 ⊕ x20 ⊕ x19 ⊕ x18 ⊕ x17 ⊕ x16 ⊕ x13
⊕ x11 ⊕ x8 ⊕ x7 ⊕ x6 ⊕ x4 ⊕ x2 ⊕ 1
– The initial value of the Boolean function at time instant t is given by
0x6B = (0, 1, 1, 0, 1, 0, 1, 1)
A pseudo-random sequence (σt)1≤t≤N is produced and xored to the plaintext (encryption)
or to the ciphertext (decryption). The encryption algorithm is given hereafter:
Algorithm 1 Pseudo-random sequence generation (base version, encryption)
Require: Secret 120-bit key K and P = (p1, . . . , pN ) a plaintext of length N
1: Key setup (R0, R1, R2, R3)← K
2: Combining function f ← 0x6B {(1, 1, 0, 1, 0, 1, 1, 0)}
3: for t from 1 to N do
4: Compute S = (R0 & 3) + 1 {Step value in [1, 4]}
5: for i from 1 to S do
6: Clock register R0 once
7: end for
8: Xt0 ← R0 & 1 {R0 output xt0}
9: τ ← (R0 >> 3) & 0x7
10: f ← f ⊕ (R0 >> τ) & 0xFF {modification pattern for f}
11: Clock registers R1, R2, R3 once and output xt1, xt2, xt3
12: σt = f(xt1 + (xt2 << 1) + (xt3 << 2))⊕ xt0
13: end for
14: return (ct = σt ⊕ pt)1≤t≤N
The base algorithm presented here is the base version. A large number of variants can be
derived from the base version:
– Feedback polynomials and Boolean function initial value can be changed.
– Registers R1R2, R3 can be irregularly clocked by register R0 according to different clocking
settings.
– Value S (step value, line 4 in Algorithm 1) and τ (line 9 in Algorithm 1) can be computed
according a lot of different ways.
3.1 BSEA-1 Security Analysis
In stream cipher theory, a number of cryptographic properties for the core primitives must be
achieved:
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– All feedback polynomials are primitive [15].
– Feedback polynomial degrees are co-prime (L0 = 23, L1 = 29, L2 = 31, L3 = 37) [15].
– Each feedback polynomial has a prime degree (in order prevent the decimation attack [6]).
– Combination Boolean function (initial value) has relatively good cryptographic properties.
The variability over the time provides a false sense of cryptographic security. Indeed, since the
truth table is constantly changing, it seems impossible to build the data required for known
attacks:
– Noisy equations for correlation attacks [16] and fast correlation attacks [9] and similar vari-
ants.
– Non-linear equations to be solved in algebraic attacks and similar variants [2].
The statistical analysis of the pseudo-random sequence expanded from the secret key is also a
very important cryptographic property. Since the design may be most of the time secret and
embedded in a device (crypto-machine for instance or a IoT device), it is however possible to
check the randomness properties in a black-box approach. In this respect BSEA-1 has been tested
with different suites: FIPS 140-2/STS (US NIST standard), TestUI01 [8] and DieHarder [4]. The
final conclusion is that BSEA-1 is statistically compliant with FIPS 140-2. It means that BSEA-
1 would then pass all classical cryptographic validation which are generally considered by the
industry.
4 BSEA-1 Cryptanalysis with the Backdoor Knowledge
4.1 Description of the Backdoor
The value of the Boolean function varies over the time. So does its Walsh spectrum.
– The Walsh transform summarizes the correlation between the Boolean function inputs and
its output value [10]
χ̂f (u) =
∑
x∈Fn2
−1f(x)⊕<x,u> and P [f(x) =< x, u >] = 12(1 +
χ̂f (u)
2n )
– The Walsh spectrum S gives the correlation for all the possible linear combination of the
function inputs u = (u1, u2, . . . , un):
S = (χ̂f (00 · · · 00), χ̂f (00 · · · 01), . . . , χ̂f (11 · · · 11))
Let us now see how to apply this on a Boolean function which is changing at each time instant
– Whenever the Boolean function takes particular values, the Walsh spectrum takes strong cor-
relation values (backdoor values) For instance when f = 0x69 then S = (0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,−8)
– For these particular values, it means that the linear combination of the inputs and the
output are equal with probability p = 1.0. It is then possible to write a linear equation whose
unknowns are the R1, R2 and R3 key bits.
– Exactly 16 values over 256 possibles have a similar Walsh spectrum.
B ={0x69, 0x5A, 0x55, 0x3C, 0x33, 0xF, 0xF0, 0xCC, 0xC3, 0xAA, 0xA5, 0x99, 0x99, 0x96,
0x66, 0x00, 0xFF}
– Values 0x00 and 0xFF enables to speed up the cryptanalysis by keeping or discarding key
candidates quickly.
It is worth mentioning that the time indices for the backdoor values are not the same from key
to key. They are strongly dependent from the secret key.
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4.2 Known Plaintext Attack
In this case we know N bits of ciphertext ((ct)1≤t≤N ) and of corresponding plaintext ((pt)1≤t≤N ).
Hence we can obtain the pseudo-random sequence in a straightforward way: σt = ct⊕pt for each
time instant t. The cryptanalysis considers an exhaustive search with respect to register R0. Here
are the main steps:
– Exhaustive search on register R0.
– For each initial value I0 of R0
• Boolean function values 0x00 and 0xFF enables to discard I0.
• We build a system of 97 equations of 97 unknowns and solve it.
• We test the final K (23 + 97 bits) against the known plaintext.
The pseudo-code of the attack is given in Algorithm 2.
Algorithm 2 BSEA-1 Cryptanalysis Algorithm (Known Plaintext Attack)
Require: Pseudo-random sequence (σt)0≤t≤N
1: for I0 from 0 to 2L0 − 1 do
2: R0 ← I0
3: for t from 1 to N do
4: Compute Boolean function value fIt0
5: if (fIt0 == 0x00 and σt 6= 0) or (fIt0 == 0xFF and σt 6= 1) then6: Discard I0 and continue
7: end if
8: if fIt0 ∈ B \ {0x00, 0xFF} then9: Write Equation and add it to the system SI0
10: end if
11: end for
12: Solve equation system SI0
13: Test the solution KI0 against (σt)0≤t≤N
14: if KI0 is correct then
15: K = KI0 and break
16: end if
17: end for
18: return K
We need only N = 1, 800 bits of known plaintext to break the whole key K with a complexity
of O(2L0) where L0 is the length of register R0. In most real-life cases, side (implementation)
backdoors enable to have a few kbits of known plaintext very easily. For instance, in strate-
gic telegraph systems (export version), synchronizing information is encrypted. In synchronous
systems (high data rate) an initial, agreed patterns of bits (generally defined in the technical
specifications) is sent but encrypted. In asynchronous system (low data rate) synchronizing bits
are inserted (called stop-bits and start-bits) and encrypted.
When evaluating a cryptographic system not only the algorithm but also its implementation
and use must be carefully analysed in order to evaluate the risk of side implementation backdoors.
Cryptographic algorithms must be armoured door installed on a cardboard wall.
4.3 Ciphertext-only Attack
The principle remains the same but requires a little bit more effort. Whenever the Boolean
function takes particular values (different from those in B), the Walsh spectrum takes strong
correlation values
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– For instance when f = 0x7 then S = (2,−2,−2, 2,−6,−2,−2, 2) (exactly 128 values over
256 possibles have a similar Walsh spectrum).
– Then we have Equation 1 + xt3 = f(xt3, xt2, xt1) holding with probability p = 0.875.
– If we consider that p[mt = 0] = 0.6 (probability of a plaintext bit to be equal to 0, which
is a rather commonly observed for many languages and for most encodings) then Equation
1 + xt3 = ct holds with probability p = 0.575
We get then a system of noisy equations to solve for each register [16]. We need about 50 kb of
ciphertext bits to recover the whole key with a complexity of at most O(254). However many
optimizations are possible to reduce this complexity significantly.
5 Conclusion and Future Work
In this paper, we have proposed one possible technique of stream cipher backdooring at the
design level. It is illustrated by a 120-bit algorithm, named BSEA-1 which exhibits many of
the desirable properties that any secure stream cipher algorithm should. When exploiting the
backdoor, we manage to break it with a very limited amount of resources successfully.
The next BSEA variant consists in slightly changing the way the Boolean function is updated
over the time. Instead of modifying the whole function, it is better to modify it “by half”. The
modification pattern pi of size 2n−1 is then applied as follows:
f ← f ⊕ ((pi << 2(n−1))|pi)
The cryptanalysis method becomes less obvious than for BSEA-1 and requires to consider far
different cryptanalysis approaches and methods.
It is worth stressing on the fact that backdooring stream ciphers requires to consider working
at the combination module mostly.
– Secure primitives of the random engine part (LFSRs) are very much well known (primitive,
dense polynomials of prime and coprime length...)
– However due to lack of combinatorial complexity, backdoored designs are bound to remain
secret mostly.
The next step in this research work about cryptographic backdooring techniques (design and de-
tection) will be to consider more sophisticated designs and primitives such as Nonlinear Feedback
Shift Registers (NLFSR), design with memory...
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